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E~ THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL SHURTLEFF, MAX S. 
ANDREWS, NED SHURTLEFF, 
HARVEY R. CARSON and GARRY 
R. COLE, General Partners, 
dba AMERICAN SALES COMPANY, 
(ASCO), a Utah Limited 
Partnership, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents 
vs. 
JAY TUFT & COMPANY, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 16470 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover unpaid rental in the amount of 
twenty thousand six hundred forty-seven dollars and seventy-five 
cents ($20,647. 75) allegedly due on the lease of a used model 35 
American backhoe, serial no. 330W. The action also seeks to recover 
fifteen thousand six hundred fifty-one dollars and seventy-three 
cents ($15,651.73) for unpaid repairs made on the said backhoe 
during the lease term. The defendant filed a counterclaim based on 
breach of express and implied warranties and negligence. The 
counterclaim requested certain damages for alleged loss of profits 
which occurred because the backhoe was not merchantable in that it 
sustained substantial repairs and down time during the lease term Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and also because certain mechanics were incompetent and unable to 
repair the backhoe; thereby making it necessary for the defendant to 
lease other equipment which operated at a reduced efficiency. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable James S. Sawaya sitting 
with a jury of seven women and one man on April 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
18, 19, 20, and 23, 1979. [R. 249]. The jury returned its verdict 
awarding to the plaintiffs the sum of thirty-six thousand three 
hundred and seventy-six dollars and nineteen cents ($36,376.19) 
which was the total amount requested less four hundred and eighty 
dollars ($480.00) for an admitted credit which had not previously 
been given to the defendant. [R. 386]. One of the jurors, Dawna 
Probst, found in favor of the defendant on its counterclaim and 
would have awarded damages for loss of profits. [Tr. 985] . Thereafter 
on May 1, 1979, the defendants served upon the plaintiffs the 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. [R. 396]. The said motion was denied by the Honorable James 
S. Sawaya in that certain ORDER dated May 11, 1979. [R. 398]. On 
May 16, 1979, the defendant filed its NOTICE OF APPEAL appealing 
from the JUDGMENT ON VERDICT OF JURY, a copy of which was attached 
to the said NOTICE OF APPEAL. [R. 403]. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to reverse the JUDGMENT ON VERDICT OF JURY 
appealed from and to have this Honorable Supreme Ccurt set aside the 
jury verdict awarding the plaintiffs the sum of Fifteen Thousand Six 
-2-
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Hundred Fifty One Dollars and Seventy-Three Cents ($15,651. 73) in 
repairs to the backhoe and to order a new trial on the remaining 
issues raised in the plaintiffs' COMPLAINT dealing with alleged 
delinquent rentals and in the defendant's COUNTERCLAIM dealing with 
loss of profits on the Alpine job. 
RECORD REFERENCES, DESIGNATION OF EXHIBITS, AND IDENTIFICATION 
OF THE PARTIES 
For purposes of clarification, the three-volume transcript 
prepared by the court reporter will be referred to as [Tr.], and any 
reference to the official record other than the court reporter's 
transcript will be designated as [R.]. 
Some of the exhibits are enlarged documents fastened onto 
pieces of cardboard. These enlarged exhibits measure approximately 
24" X 40" and are more appropriately in the nature of "charts". In 
order to clearly identify which exhibit is being discussed, the 
defendant will refer to the "regular" exhibits as [Ex. P-2], [Ex. D-
15], etc.; and the "enlarged" documents will be referred to as [Ex. 
D-3(chart)], etc. The defendant hopes this explanation will assist 
the court to more readily find the particular exhibit. 
The parties will be referred to in this brief as plaintiffs and 
defendant, the way they are identified during the trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant is a Utah corporation engaged primarily in 
building water and sewer lines for municipalities under competitive 
contract bidding [R.797]. The plaintiff, American Sales Company, 
-3-
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(hereafter referred to as ASCO) is a Utah limited partnership. [See 
~l of plaintiff's Complaint-R. 2]. ASCO's general partners were 
Paul Shurtleff, Max S. Andrews, Ned E. Shurtleff, Harvey R. Carson 
and Garry R. Cole. [R. 2]. ASCO sold and rented backhoes and all 
types of dirt equipment such as rollers, compactors, etc. [Tr. S]. 
One of the general partners, Harvey R. Carson, was the manager of 
ASCO. [Tr. S] . 
On or about March 23, 1977, the parties executed an EQUIPMENT 
LEASE AGREEMENT [Ex. P-1, Ex. D-3(chart)]. In this agreement, the 
defendant leased from the plaintiff American Sales Company one (1) 
used American hydraulic backhoe model 3S, serial number 330W equipped 
with a two (2) cubic yard bucket. Plaintiffs' witness Darrell 
Lester stated this was one of the shorter lived pieces of equipment 
in the industry. [Tr. 206-207]. The monthly rental was forty-eight 
hundred dollars ($4,800.00) per month plus applicable taxes. 
Plaintiffs own witnesses admitted this monthly rental contained a 
reserve for depreciation, repairs and maintenance to the backhoe. 
[Tr. 7, S4-55, and 206). The said monthly rental contemplated the 
use of the backhoe upon a basis not to exceed eight (8) hours per 
day and five (5) days per week and one hundred seventy-six (176) 
hours per month [See ~8A. of Exs. P-1 and D-3(chart)]. The lease 
term was for a minimum period of thirty (30) days beginning on March 
21, 1977, with rental payments becoming due and payable every thirty 
(30) days. 
Harvey Carson, one of ASCO's officers, testified that prior to 
the execution of Exhibit P-1, the plaintiffs' performed a "final 
servicing" on the backhoe. [Tr. 44-4S]. The purpose of this 
service was to put the backhoe in good operating condition so when a 
-4-
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customer takes it out there are no defects in it. [Tr. 45]. 
Plaintiffs witnesses further admitted they knew the backhoe would be 
used by the defendant to fulfill certain obligations under contracts 
with municipalities which contained deadlines for completion. [Tr. 
790-792]. Mr. Carson admitted he represented the backhoe would be 
able to do the work for which it was intended, had just been completely 
serviced, and did not have any defects that he knew about. [Tr. 
45]. 
Notwithstanding these express warranties and representations 
regarding the merchantable condition of the backhoe, it broke down 
immediately'. The very next day after it was delivered to the Murray 
job site, the left axle broke. [Ex. P-6]. The defendant called 
Harvey Carson who dispatched three mechanics from Shurtleff & 
Andrews to repair the axle, to wit: Ray Baldwin, Chip Woods and 
Gordon Taylor. [Tr. 25, Ex. P-6]. When they arrived at the job 
site, they determined there were several other serious problems and 
repairs that had to be made. These included an alternator that 
would not charge, a horn button that was missing, a counter-balance 
that was leaking, a swing motor that was leaking on top, and other 
hydraulic problems. [Ex. P-6]. The three mechanics spent a total of 
twenty five and one-half (25 1/2) hours repairing the backhoe at a 
cost of seven hundred twenty-eight dollars and twenty-eight cents 
($728.28). [Ex. P-6]. The repairs were all itemized on a Shurtleff 
& Andrews work order R0-070 dated 3/22/77. [Ex. P. 6]. ASCO 
acknowledged they were responsible for repairing all these defective 
items, and did not pass on the charges to defendant. 
From the day the backhoe was delivered to the Murray job site 
on March 21, 1977, until the day it was picked up from the Alpine 
-5-
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job site ten months later on January 23, 1978, the backhoe experienced 
regular and serious disrepair, problems of all sorts, and substantial 
down time. [Exs. P-6, D-7 through D-17. Tr. 752 et seq which is 
a chronological summary of the defects]. 
The main categories of problems which the defendant experienced 
on the backhoe were with (1) the axle which broke twice (once in the 
Murray job site on March 22nd and again in the Wellington job site 
on June 15th, less than three months later), (2) the charging system 
(which required replacement of an alternator on the Murray job site, 
and again on the Wellington job site as well as replacement of a 
regulator, batteries, and other electrical parts); and (3) sub-
stantial and numerous hydraulic problems that are reflected in 
nearly every invoice from March 22, 1977, through January 23, 1978. 
[Ex. P-6 and D-7 through D-17]. 
The total cost of these repairs amounted to nearly sixteen 
thousand dollars ($16,000.00) as noted on plaintiff's Exhibit P-22. 
The down time which the defendant experienced during the ten month 
period of the lease agreement because of the defective condition of 
the backhoe was approximately 22 days as more fully set forth on 
defendant's Exhibit D-45 (chart). 
The problems with the hydraulic system became so serious that 
by November 16, 1977, the backhoe could not operate at all because 
the boom and bucket stuck in the trench and could not be lifted out. 
[Tr. 541]. This created a dangerous condition which made it imposs-
ible to operate the backhoe any further until the problems with the 
hydraulic system were corrected. [Tr. 541, 670-672]. At this point 
the ASCO mechanics were also baffled, and although they were at the 
-6-
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job site on November 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25, 
attempting to fix the same problems with sticky valves which continued 
to reoccur each day, they were unable to do so. [Tr. 326-330]. 
Finally, by November 28, 1979, the entire hydraulic system broke 
down and became so contaminated with metal filings and other impur-
ities that it had to be completely flushed out and numerous parts 
were replaced at a cost of some twelve thousand dollars ($12,000.00). 
[Tr. 326-330, Ex. D-14]. Even after this transfusion, the hydraulic 
system still continued to malfunction and mechanics were sent out 
for repairs on December 19, 1979, and January 6, 1980. [Tr. 326-
330]. 
The defendant Jay Tuft & Company was under certain contract 
deadlines to complete the installation of the sewer line at Alpine. 
When the leased backhoe broke down with the hydraulic problems, the 
defendant asked the plaintiffs for a substitute backhoe in order to 
meet its contract obligations. [Tr. 794-796]. ASCO was the only 
dealer in the State of Utah who had a model 35 backhoe. [Tr. 794]. 
Although the plaintiffs had a substitute model 35 machine available 
at their Salt Lake City offices, they refused to let the defendant 
take it, presumably because they were negotiating for its sale to 
other third parties. [Tr. 794-796]. The said sale never materialized. 
[Tr. 796]. 
After being turned down by ASCO, the defendant brought other 
backhoes consisting of a Drott 50 and later a Cat 235 to continue 
digging where the model 35 had broken down. [Tr. 539-541, 543-544, 
813-820]. The machines use the same crews as the model 35 backhoe; 
however, since they were smaller, they were less efficient, and all 
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the witnesses acknowledged this fact. [Tr. 544, 817, 932 et seg, 
Exs. D-56 (chart), D-57(chart)]. This loss of efficiency and down 
time for repairs resulted in a substantial loss of profits on the 
Alpine job and constituted the basis for defendant's COUNTERCLAIM. 
[R. 152-157; Exs. D-56, 57(charts)]. 
The defendant refused to pay for the repairs to the machine 
because it felt they were the responsibility of ASCO for the reasons 
set forth in POINT I of the ARGUMENT herein. [Tr. 821-822, 843, 
896-897]. It also refused to pay more than the approximately 
twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000.00) it had already paid for 
rental of the machine, until it could determine its own losses for 
down time, repairs and loss of profits and other consequential 
damages in connection with the repeated breakdowns in the machine. 
Tr. 843, 897]. 
On January 16, 1978, the plaintiffs through their counsel, 
Robert J. Neilson, sent a letter to the defendant stating that 
unless the full delinquent amount which was claimed to be due and 
owing was paid within five days of receipt of the letter, the 
plaintiffs intended to terminate their lease agreement. [Ex. P-2]. 
Thereafter, on January 23, 1978, the plaintiffs repossessed the 
backhoe. 
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POINT I 
THE JURY VERDICT AWARDIHG TO THE PLAINTIFFS FIFTEEN THOUSAND 
SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY-ONE DOLLARS AND SEVENTY-THREE CENTS ($15,651.73) 
FOR REPAIRS TO THE BACKHOE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE BUT IS 
BASED UPON SPECULATION, CONJECTURE, PASSION, AND PREJUDICE. 
1. The mechanics sent out by Shurtleff & Andrews Construction 
Co. to repair the backhoe were incompetent to make the repairs 
according to the generally accepted standards of good workmanship 
prevailing in the community, and they were, in fact, responsible 
for the breakdown of the backhoe. The jury verdict was for 
$36,376.19 [R. 386). This was the total amount requested 
[Ex. P-22) less a $480.00 credit on the rent. Of this amount 
$15,651.73 was for repairs [Ex. P-22). The defendant submits the 
seven women on the jury did not understand the technical aspects of 
the backhoe as related to the three general categories of repair, to 
wit: the two broken axles, the charging system which required 
replacement of alternators, regulators, batteries, relay switches, 
etc., and the hydraulic system which was under constant repair, 
nor was there any evidence to support their verdict. 
Plaintiffs' witness, Darrell Lester, admitted the American 
hydraulic backhoe model 35 was one of the shortest lived pieces of 
equipment in the industry. [Tr. 206-207]. The backhoe in the 
instant case had been purchased by ASCO in 1975, and by the time the 
instant lease agreement was executed on March 21, 1977, it had 
already been leased twice before by Jay Tuft & Company and also by 
two other construction companies. [Ex. D-42, Tr. 110, 149, 639-643]. 
On March 21, 1977, it had approximately two thousand three hundred 
and twenty (2,320) hours of operation. [Ex. D-42). It broke down 
-9-
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the day after the defendant received it, necessitating a new 
alternator, a new axle, and repairs to the hydraulic system because 
of the counter-balance leaking, the swivel leaking, and the swing 
motor leaking. [Ex. P-6]. 
The hydraulic problems continued throughout the next ten (10) 
months. [Exs. D-7 through D-17]. During all of these times, the 
defendant contacted Harvey Carson at ASCO and reported the defects 
and problems. Harvey Carson then assigned some of Shurtleff & 
Andrews' mechanics to the job. [Tr. 24-25]. Ray Baldwin was 
assigned to nearly every work order pertaining to the backhoe during 
the term of the LEASE AGREEMENT. [See Exs. P-6 and D-7 through D-
17] . 
Since nearly twelve thousand dollars ($12,000.00) of the repairs 
pertain to the decontamination of the hydraulic system, the defendant 
will now briefly describe that system. [Mechanic Ray Baldwin Tr. 311-
316, 334-340; designer Charles Wienke Tr. 396-400, 438-461; owner 
of construction business Harold Babcock Tr. 672-686, 697-698]. 
The hydraulic oil is put into the machine from a drum or other 
container much like gasoline enters an automobile. The oil then 
goes to a storage reservoir which is not completely filled. 
When the backhoe is started, the hydraulic oil is distributed throughoul 
the system both by means of the pressure in the storage reservoir as 
well as by certain motors and pumps in the machine. 
The circulating oil first enters a main 25-micron hydraulic 
filter which is similar to the oil filter in a car, but much larger. 
This filter has a magnetic separator which is placed in the middle 
of the filter from top to bottom. This separator is made up of tiny 
magnets. Both the filter and magnetic separator are safety devices 
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installed by the manufacturer to remove metal particles, dirt, and 
other impurities which are always present in the hydraulic system, 
simply from normal operation. When the filters and magnetic separator 
become clogged, they must be replaced. The manufacturer's expert 
witness, Charles Wienke, stated that the filters do not need to be 
replaced after any given number of hours of operation, but whenever 
they become clogged. 
The condition of the filter can be seen by a visual indicator 
on the filter itself. This visual indicator is a small flag which 
can be easily seen by the operator by opening two metal doors and 
looking at the filter. This act takes less than three minutes. 
If the flag is silver in color, the filter is okay. When the flag 
is red, this means the oil is "bypassing" the filter. When the 
oil is bypassing the filter, it can be easily observed from the same 
"windows". In this "bypass" condition, the oil goes over the top of 
the filter rather than through it. 
This "bypass" feature is important to the instant appeal. When 
the backhoe first starts up in the morning, the oil will bypass the 
filter until it is warmed up. During this warm-up time, the red flag 
will appear at the visual indicator. During this time, the operator 
will be able to observe the oil going over the top of the filter. 
After the machine is warmed up, the oil then goes through the filter 
and the red flag disappears and is replaced by a silver one. 
The "bypass" system in the main hydraulic 25-micron filter 
is a safety device installed by the manufacturer to allow the 
hydraulic oil to get to the pumps and other moving parts in the 
main motors and swing motors while the machine is warming up and 
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during times when the main filter is clogges. If this system didn't 
exist, the pumps would starve from lack of oil and wou "cavitate" 
or deteriorate. 
If the filter is clogged with metal filings, dirt, particles, 
and other impurities, the oil will continue to go over the top of 
the filter even when the machine is warmed up. This condition will 
then alert the operator that he should change the filter element. 
If he fails to change it, then the impurities in the oil will 
continue to flow over the top of the filter and into the main hydraulic 
system. These impurities can then become imbedded in valves, pistons, 
and other moving parts causing them to stick and the hydraulic 
backhoe to malfunction. They can also cause other damage such as to 
pumps by hitting against the pump blades, causing them to deteriorate, 
etc. 
The pumps will also deteriorate simply through normal wear and 
tear without any problem of contamination in the system. Once the 
pumps start to deteriorate for whatever reason, they go out quickly 
in a matter of three to four hours. When they do deteriorate, they 
also spew metal filings and other impurities into the system. 
These impurities will be picked up by the main 25-micron hydraulic 
filter and magnetic separator until the elements become clogged. 
At that point, and unless the filter is replaced, impurities from 
the deteriorating pumps, etc. will circulate in the system and cause 
problems with the other moving parts. 
After the hydraulic oil leaves the main hydraulic 25-micron 
filter and magnetic separator, it circulates to other parts of the 
system. One of these sections contains the swing motor which turns 
the backhoe around during operation. Before the oil gets into the 
swing motor, it goes through a 10-micron filter which, like the main 
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25-micron filter, is there to filter out smaller impurities and to 
protect the swing motor from contamination. If the swing system is 
not operating properly, there is a red light on the dash in the 
operator's cab which comes on to alert the operator to a potential 
problem. This red light in the operator's cab is the only visual 
indicator on the backhoe which deals solely with the swing system; 
and is further the only visual means an operator has to alert him to 
possible danger in the swing system. Sometimes the operator can 
detect a different noise in the swing motor if there are problems 
with contamination. The witnesses refer to this noise as "whining" 
or "yowling". [Tr. 397]. Another witness testified the motion 
on the backhoe would become jerky and could be felt as the operator 
swung the housing around. [Tr. 680]. 
Another safety feature is a sight glass which could be 
observed and which was installed by the manufacturer to allow an 
operator to visually determine the level of the hydraulic oil in the 
system. [Tr. 399]. 
In conclusion, the manufacturer has designed at least four 
safety devices to prevent the impurities in the hydraulic oil from 
damaging the pump and other moving parts. These are (1) the main 
25-micron hydraulic filter, (2) the magnetic separator inside the 
hydraulic filter, (3) the bypass system which allows oil to get to 
the moving parts even though the filter and magnetic separator are 
clogged, and (4) the 10-micron filter associated with the swing 
motor and swing system. These are also visual indicators on the 
main hydraulic filter, and a red light in the operator's cab pertaining 
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to the swing motor and system, as well as a sight glass to determine 
the level of the hydraulic oil in the system. 
The Shurtleff & Andrews' mechanics, Ray Baldwin and Chip Woods, 
had been dispatched to the Alpine job site on October 28, 1977, to 
repair the stick cylinder and to repack same at a charge to the 
defendant of one thousand one hundred sixteen dollars and ninety-
four cents ($1,116.94). [Ex. D-13]. Approximately two weeks later 
on November 16, 1977, the stick cylinder again malfunctioned, making 
it impossible to bring the stick or boom or bucket out of the 
trench. [Tr. 541]. The defendant called Harvey Carson who dis-
patched Ray Baldwin to the Alpine job site. [Tr. 303]. 
It was at this point that the hydraulic system began to det-
eriorate rapidly resulting in a cost of nearly twelve thousand 
dollars ($12,000.00) for a complete decontamination job which 
required a major overhaul and the replacement of numerous parts in 
the backhoe hydraulic system [Ex. D-14]. 
Mr. Baldwin stated that on March 16, 1977, he diagnosed the 
problem as a plugged unloader valve that hung open allowing the 
hydraulic oil to pass through. [Tr. 305]. He testified he remedied 
the problem, checked the controls afterwards, and made sure the 
machine was operating properly that evening and then left. [Tr. 
305]. He further testified he was called back the very next day on 
November 17th to take care of exactly the same problem that had 
existed the day before. The bucket or boom was off to the side of 
the trench. [Tr. 306-307] . 
In order to bring out the number of times that this "expert" 
mechanic was on the job site to fix the identical problem, his 
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deposition was published. [Tr. 326]. He was asked about his 
written statement which had been prepared by him and given to ASCO 
and which was attached as Exhibit 1 to the deposition. [Tr. 326 et 
~] . He admitted each day he worked on exactly the same problem as 
the day before, and thought he had fixed the problem each night when 
he left the job site. However, he admitted the next day the problem 
existed and he had to go back out. [Tr. 326 et ~]. He said he 
was there on November 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25, working 
each day on the same problem he felt he had corrected when he left 
the night before. [Tr. 32 6- 330] . 
Ray Baldwin testified that from November 28th through December 
3rd, three mechanics worked on completely decontaminating the 
hydraulic system and replacing all the parts. [Tr. 326-330, Ex. D-
14]. Although by December 3rd, the hydraulic system had been completely 
flushed out, and numerous parts had been replaced, the system 
continued to experience problems. Ray Baldwin came out again on 
December 19th and later on January 6th to work on problems in the 
hydraulic system. [Tr. 326-330]. 
Mr. Baldwin was permitted to testify over objection by defen-
dant's counsel that in his opinion the backhoe was not maintained 
properly. [Tr. 322]. When he was asked the question "What did Jay 
Tuft not do that he should have done, in your opinion?" he stated 
"the defendant should have visually inspected the main hydraulic 
filter to determine whether it was plugged or not." [Tr. 323]. 
The defendant submits it was negligence for Ray Baldwin not to 
check the visual indicators on the hydraulic filters to determine 
whether they were, in fact, contaminated. This was a routinely 
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simple operation, taking less than three minutes. Since Mr. 
Baldwin was permitted to testify over objection that the hydraulic 
system was not properly maintained by Jay Tuft & Company and 
since this conclusion of improper maintenance was based solely on 
the grounds that Jay Tuft should have checked the visual indicators, 
it follows ipso facto that if Ray Baldwin had a duty to check the 
same visual indicators during the several days he was working on 
the backhoe commencing November 16, 1977, that his failure to do 
so would also constitute negligence. 
Mr. Baldwin testified he did not believe he had any duty to 
check the main hydraulic filter visual indicator since the 
maintenance of the machine was routinely the responsibility of 
Jay Tuft & Company. [Tr. 341-343]. However, the defendant submits 
when it called ASCO and reported the repairs and when ASCO sent 
certain mechanics to the field to take care of the repairs, that 
the defendant had the right to rely on ASCO to get competent 
mechanics to repair the hydraulic problems, and further that the 
defendant had the right to expect these mechanics would be able 
to diagnose a problem correctly and to take the necessary safeguards 
which were needed to both correct the defects and to do so at a 
minimum cost to the defendant. 
Plaintiffs' own expert witness, Charles Wienke, the service 
manager for American Hoist Company, Duluth, Minnesota, who designed 
and manufactured the American hydraulic backhoe testified that a 
service man such as Mr. Baldwin who had been called out to repair 
problems such as a boom sticking in the trench and who was charging 
the defendant for his time, should have inspected the main hydraulic 
filter before he left the job each night to see if it was contam-
inated. [Tr. 450]. 
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He was emphatic that a clogged filter would cause the pump 
to deteriorate. [Tr. 404-405]. He stated the backhoe has several 
sources of contamination by virtue of its normal operation. These 
sources are (1) wear plates in the gear pumps and valve plates 
and wash plates in the piston pump. [Tr. 404] (2) The hydraulic 
cylinder coming in contact with the ground and picking up rocks, 
dirt and other debris. [Tr. 405] (3) Simply from the moving 
parts giving out metal filings through normal use. [Tr. 406] 
(4) Metal filings as large as 40 microns in size that cannot be 
purged at the factory and continue to come from the wear of parts 
on the machine. [Tr. 407]. 
Mr. Baldwin testified that during the first several days 
beginning with November 16, 1977, he was working on the same problems 
with the sticking unloader valves, and that each night the machine 
was operating properly when he left the job site. [Tr. 305 and 
308]. However, Mr. Baldwin admitted that he did not check the 
hydraulic filters. [Tr. 323]. Mr. Wienke testified that if he had 
been Mr. Baldwin, he would have checked the hydraulic filters before 
testifying that the machine was operating properly when Baldwin left 
each night, because sticking unloader valves would indicate some 
unnecessary contamination in the system. [Tr. 461]. Consequently, 
the plaintiffs' own expert witness testified that Ray Baldwin was 
negligent in the way he operated the machine by not inspecting the 
hydraulic filters. 
Mr. Baldwin made the following significant admissions bearing 
on his negligence: 
1. He admitted that it was ten days to two weeks from the 
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first time he went down to work on the hydraulic system until he 
determined it was contaminated, even though he was at the site 
every working day. [Tr. 387]. 
2. He, himself, never made any visual inspection of the 
hydraulic filters for several days prior to the time he determined 
the system was contaminated even though he was on the ground each 
day working on exactly the same problem as the day before. [Tr. 
323]. 
~- He admitted that if he had replaced the pumps the first day 
he was there on November 16th, the system would not have been as 
contaminated as it was two weeks later. [Tr. 387]. 
4. If the pumps were going out, the contamination in the 
system would be increased substantially each day up to the point of 
plugging the filter. [Tr. 387]. 
5. He had not changed the pumps prior to the time in Alpine 
and did not know how long they had been on the machine. [Tr. 383]. 
The mechanic, Ray Baldwin, stated in his opinion the system 
had become contaminated because of certain pumps in the main 
hydraulic system which deteriorated, thereby discharging metal 
particles into the system. [Tr. 318, 332, 339]. He further 
admitted that metal filings will be in the system through normal 
wear and tear just because of the hydraulic oil hitting the pump. 
[Tr. 332]. In this connection he disagreed with plaintiffs' other 
expert witness Charles Wienke who testified the pumps do not go 
out first clogging the filter but rather the clogged filter causes 
the pumps to deteriorate. [Tr. 404, 405]. The defendant's 
position is that if Mr. Baldwin had checked the hydraulic filters 
several days before he actually did, he could have determined the 
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filters were clogged just as easily as the operator could, and 
the pumps could have been replaced at a nominal charge and the entire 
system would not have to be decontaminated resulting in numerous 
parts being replaced at a cost of $12,000.00. [Ex. D-14]. 
Mr. Baldwin further admitted that even after the system had 
been totally decontaminated and most of the parts replaced, that the 
defendant still experienced problems with the hydraulic system. 
[Tr. 326-330]. The defendant submits that the reason these future 
problems were experienced, was because the mechanic, Ray Baldwin, 
did not follow the operator's manual in the way he decontaminated 
the system. He merely flushed out the system rather than taking out 
all of the parts and cleaning them separately as the operator's 
manual suggested. In this regard, the operator's manual was intro-
duced into evidence as Exhibit D-36 and the check list for the 
decontamination procedures begins on page 150. Mr. Baldwin's 
testimony regarding the decontamination procedures begins at Tr. 
351. He admitted that he had not removed and dismantled the hydraulic 
cylinders. He admitted that he did not take the track drive motors 
out, nor did he remove the swivel assembly from the main deck and 
disassemble and clean it thoroughly. He further admitted that he 
did not take the air cooler out and that he did not pull the travel 
bank valves out. [Tr. 351 et ~]. 
The defendant's expert witness, Harold Babcock, testified that 
the manufacturer's recommendations for decontaminating the system 
should be followed exactly and that the mechanics did not have the 
right to substitute their own judgment for what the manufacturer 
recommended. [Tr. 686]. He testified that it was not satisfactory 
to merely flush out the system rather than to take each part out 
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separately and clean it because you could not be sure that all the 
impurities were removed unless the system was both flushed out and 
the parts were taken out and cleaned separately. [Tr. 686] . He 
testified that if some of the impurities remain in the system, it 
would cause the valves to stick and present other problems in the 
hydraulic system. [Tr. 686]. 
2. There was no evidence of any operator abuse on the 
part of the defendant insofar as the repairs to the backhoe were 
concerned. 
Since Mr. Baldwin was the expert mechanic dispatched to 
repair the sticky valves for several days prior to the time he 
checked the hydraulic filters, it appears clear if the operator 
of the backhoe had a duty to check the filters before operating 
each morning, that Mr. Baldwin had the same duty to check the 
filters before he operated the machine each night after he completed 
his repairs. Mr. Baldwin had no right to rely on someone else to 
take care of his work, especially when it would only have taken 
less than two minutes to look at the visual indicators to determine 
if the hydraulic filter had become clogged. Plaintiffs expert 
witness, Charles Wienke, who designed the backhoe and was a 
service manager of the manufacturer testified he would have 
checked the hydraulic filters each day. [Tr. 450, 461]. 
The only other ground of operator abuse was that the defendant's 
operators did not properly warm up the backhoe in the morning. The 
plaintiffs EXPERT witness Charles Wienke testied that improper 
warm-up procedures could cause "cavitation" of the pumps. [Tr. 
393-394, 397, 404]. This condition exists when the pumps don't 
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get any oil and their gears don't have anything to move on. This 
creates a vacuum in the pump which will pull particles of metal 
out of the pump. He testified when the oil is cold and has a 
high viscosity it doesn't want to run through the filter. During 
this time the pumps will have to "pull" the oil; instead of the 
oil flowing routinely to the pumps. He admitted if the proper 
warm-up procedure is followed cavitation would not exist, and 
further the bypass system on the main hydraulic filter is designed 
to allow hydraulic oil to circulate to the pump under normal 
warming up conditions. The mechanic Ray Baldwin also testied the 
bypass system is a safety device that allows oil to get to the 
pump. [Tr. 383). Mr. Wienke testified this condition of cavitation 
would spew metal particles into the hydraulic system where they 
would be picked up by the filter. He further testied that an 
operator could detect this cavitation condition by either looking 
at the visual indicator or by the sound of the pumps which gives 
off a whining, yowling noise which is a different sound than 
would exist under normal operating conditions. [Tr. 397). 
The plaintiffs attempt to use this testimony of cavitation 
to "infer" the defendant's operators were negligent in not properly 
warming up the backhoe. However, the ready answer to that "inference" 
is two-fold. First Ray Baldwin was at the job site every day 
from November 16, 1977, until he detected the plugged hydraulic 
filter. He operated the machine each night before he left and 
did not detect either a whining, yowling noise or see any red 
lights on the dash in the operator's cab. Consequently he was 
the "operator" each day and had as much or more duty than any of 
Jay Tuft's employees to check the filter since he had been 
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dispatched by Shurtleff & Andrews to correct the hydraulic 
problems. Secondly, Charles Wienke's testimony of "cavitation" 
caused by improper warm up procedures was never linked up to any 
evidence of improper warm-up procedures and if the jury based its 
decision on the grounds of operator abuse it was based on speculation. 
conjecture, passion and prejudice. 
None of the plaintiffs' witnesses testified thev ever 
observed Jay Tuft's operators warming up the machine improperly. 
Of the five witnesses called by the plaintiffs, three of them 
never saw the backhoe being operated, to wit: Harvey Carson, 
[Tr. 72] Darrell Lester, and Charles Wienke. [Tr. 422]. One of 
the remaining two witnesses, Darrell Hulse, testified that he did 
observe the backhoe on the Murray job site; however, it was under 
working conditions, and he did not observe it during the warm-up 
period in the morning. [Tr. 134]. The final witness, Ray Baldwin, 
made the following confessions. (a) The backhoe was being operated 
properly by Jay Tuft's crews at the Decker Lake job. [Tr. 286]. 
(b) He admitted that most operators will open the doors and look 
at the visual indicator on the main hydraulic filter; however, he 
did not know of his own personal knowledge whether the operator 
on the Alpine job did or did not do this. [Tr. 330-331]; (c) He 
admitted he had never observed any of Jay Tuft's employees that 
were not warming up the machine the way he had explained to them 
it should be done. [Tr. 369]; (d) He admitted he had never been 
around the machine when it was warmed up and didn't have any 
personal knowledge as to whether the operators were following the 
correct warm-up procedures or not. [Tr. 369]. 
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Defendant's witnesses all testified the defendant's operator 
Darwin Rich was one of the best in the business, and was very 
circumspect in warming up the backhoe. [Tr. 493-495, 528-531; 
572-573]. 
3. The lease agreement which the parties signed and as 
interpreted by the plaintiffs' own witnesses provided the 
plaintiffs would make the repairs free of charge, and the 
plaintiffs did, in fact, make similar repairs free of charge. The 
lease agreement itself is silent as to who has the responsibility 
to pay for the repairs to the backhoe. [Exs. P-1, D-3(chart)]. 
Paragraph 6 of the lease states as follows: "(6) The lessee 
shall keep the equipment in good repair and condition and will 
return the equipment in as good condition as when leased, including 
final servicing, reasonable wear and tear excepted." All of the 
witnesses who testified as to what these terms meant in the 
equipment leasing business, testified that the plaintiff, ASCO, 
would have the responsibility to take care of all of the repairs 
which existed in the instant case unless there was evidence of 
operator abuse. [See ARGUMENT, POINT 1(4) infra]. 
However, there is also testimony by plaintiffs' own witnesses 
which further establishes a policy by ASCO to pay for the three 
major categories of repairs that existed in the instant case. The 
defendant had two other similar leases with ASCO prior to the one 
involved in the instant case. [Tr. 110]. One of these involved 
the lease of the backhoe for a job in Vernal, Utah. Mr. Tuft 
testified the salesman, Darrell Hulse, had told him in Vernal 
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that ASCO repaired everything on the machine but the outside 
hoses and the bucket teeth. [Tr. 872, 874]. Darrell Hulse did 
not resume the stand to rebut this testimony; therefore, his 
previous testimony regarding conversations with Jay Tuft and also 
the policy of ASCO in paying for repairs on the backhoe must 
stand. 
Darrell Hulse admitted he had a conversation with Jay Tuft 
concerning repairs and maintenance on the backhoe, and this 
conversation took place just prior to the time the lease was 
signed. [Tr. 141]. Mr. Hulse's deposition was published and 
when he was questioned about his comments on page 27 et ~. 
he admitted he told Jay Tuft that if his company had any major 
problems, such as if a pump or something goes out or something 
serious goes wrong with the machine, that Jay Tuft would merely 
have to call ASCO and they would come down and repair the machine. 
[Tr. 145]. He admitted that ASCO would come out and make the 
repairs free of charge if it was a major item and if it was not 
the customer's fault. [Tr. 145). He admitted the major items of 
repair that would be taken care of free of charge by ASCO would 
be the axles, the alternator and generator or charging systems, 
and pumps in the hydraulic system. [Tr. 177). 
When being asked questions about his testimony on page 28 of 
his deposition, he stated that if pumps or other serious breakdowns 
on the machine occurred that ASCO would repair them free of 
charge and the only responsibility of Jay Tuft & Company would be 
to maintain the machine and lubricate it on a daily basis. [Tr. 
176-177]. He agreed that it's only where operator abuse can be 
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shown that the customer would have to pay for it. (Tr. 176-177]. 
Mr. Hulse further testified that both he and Harvey Carson, one 
of the owners of ASCO and also general manager of the business, 
would sit down and determine as to any particular repair whether 
they would charge the customer for it or whether ASCO would pay 
for it. [Tr. 172]. He said the main factor that ASCO would use 
in determining whether the customer should pay for the repairs or 
ASCO would be if the customer had abused the backhoe. (Tr. 173]. 
He further admitted that ASCO had the responsibility to take care 
of the parts that wear out through ordinary wear and tear such as 
a tube or a hose leaking. [Tr. 146,173-175]. Harvey Carson 
admitted that he was present when a conversation took place 
between Jay Tuft and Darrell Hulse concerning the maintenance, 
repairs and servicing of the backhoe; however, he himself did not 
enter into the conversation and he could not recall any specifics 
concerning it. [Tr. 15, 42-43]. Mr. Carson did, however, admit 
that fair wear and tear would require the hydraulic cylinder [Tr. 
99] and tracks and pins [Tr. 74] to be replaced. 
For the reasons set forth above, it appears clear the policy 
of ASCO in making the repairs depended primarily upon whether 
there was operator abuse or not. If there was not operator abuse 
shown, then ASCO would pay for major repairs such as the charging 
system, axles, and pumps, and would also replace free of charge 
those items that went out through normal wear and tear such as 
hydraulic hoses, o-rings, etc. This is the policy that had been 
followed on the prior two leases, and there is aboslutely no 
testimony that the plaintiffs charged Jay Tuft for any repairs on 
the prior leases. 
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Furthermore, insofar as the instant lease was concerned, it 
appears the plaintiffs did, in fact, pay for all the repairs that 
were made on the Murray job site on the March 22, 1977 work 
order, and, the plaintiffs' office manager and bookkeeper, Darrell 
Lester presented a further exhibit showing an additional three 
thousand dollars ($3,000.00) of repairs paid for by ASCO during 
the third lease term. [Ex. P-21]. 
The defendant is at a loss to determine why some of these 
repairs were paid for, and not all of them. None of the plaintiffs' 
witnesses gave any reasons to help resolve this dilemma. The 
plaintiffs' witnesses did testify that the monthly rental of four 
thousand eight hundred dollars ($4,800.00) included a reserve for 
repairs as well as maintenance and depreciation on the backhoe. 
[Tr. 7, 54-55, 206]. Since the monthly rental contains a reserve 
for repairs and maintenance, it is unconscionable to allow ASCO 
to collect a second time from the defendant. This point of 
unjust enrichment is more fully discussed in POINT 1(7) infra]. 
4. The testimony of all the expert witnesses who interpreted 
the terms of the lease agreement according to the custom and usage 
of those terms in the industry stated the plaintiff should make 
the repairs free of charge. The only paragraph in the lease 
agreement that deals with repairs to the backhoe is paragraph 6. 
[See Exs. P-1 and D-3 (chart)]. This paragraph reads as follows: 
"The lessee shall keep the equipment in good repair and condition 
and will return the equipment in as good condition as when leased 
including final servicing, reasonable wear and tear excepted." 
We have already discussed ASCO's interpretation of this paragraph 
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through its salesman Darrell Hulse. [See POINT I(3)] This 
testimony was pennissible because the lease agreement itself 
does not define the terms, and parol evidence would therefore be 
admissable. Furthermore, since ASCO prepared the lease agreement 
[Tr. 78), it should be construed most strictly against ASCO in 
the event there is any ambiguity, and the court so instructed the 
jury. [Instruction No. 18, R. 361]. 
Harvey Carson, one of the owners of ASCO was plaintiffs' 
first witness. [Tr. 3-4). When defendant's counsel asked Mr. 
Carson about what the words "reasonable wear and tear" as used in 
paragraph 6 of the lease agreement meant in the industry, the 
trial judge sustained an objection to the question. [Tr. 114-
117). The court stated: 
"I don't think reasonable wear and tear is going to be 
that difficult of a definition. These jurors are going 
to be able to detennine just from conunon experience, as 
far as I'm concerned. I've already got an instruction 
in mind on that subject. I don't know if there is any 
authority for it." [Tr. 117). 
Later the trial judge changed his mind on this matter and 
required testimony to interpret the words "reasonable wear and 
tear" and "good repair and condition". [Tr. 371-372 (Ray Baldwin); 
Tr. 662 (Harold Babcock); 803-804 (Jay Tuft)]. 
The trial judge did not define either "reasonable wear and 
tear" or "good repair and condition" in the court's jury instructions, 
but did instruct the jury they could look to custom and usage in 
the industry for the meaning of these terms. [Instruction No. 
19, R. 362]. The defendant submits the plaintiffs produced 
absolutely no evidence on the issue of custom and usage and the 
only testimony is that of Mr. Harold Babcock, and Jay Tuft, 
described below who both defined the tenns in paragraph 6 to mean 
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that, absent operator abuse, the equipment lessor will be respon-
sible for all of the repairs made by ASCO in the instant case and 
charged to the defendant. 
The defendant called Harold Babcock as an expert witness. 
His qualifications are set out at Tr. 651-661. After ASCO 
repossessed the model 35 backhoe from Jay Tuft, it was leased to 
Mr. Babcock's company, Engineer Construction, Inc. Mr. Babcock 
had 35 years experience in the construction business [Tr. 652] 
and his company was engaged in installing water and sewer lines 
similar to that being done by Mr. Tuft. He had leased or purchased 
the backhoe, loaders, dozers, cranes, trucks, ditchers, pavers, 
etc. [Tr. 654-655]. He was familiar with the terms in leases 
that were similar to those used in ASCO's lease. 
Mr. Babcock then testified that insofar as the terms "ordinary 
wear and tear" or "reasonable wear and tear" are concerned, and 
as it applied to the instant lease and the model 35 backhoe, that 
equipment lessors will take responsibility for normal wear and 
tear. [Tr. 663]. He stated they do not take responsibility for 
any negligence or damage done by the operator. [Tr . 6 6 3 ] . He 
testified filter elements themselves need to be replaced as they 
become contaminated or dirty and those are the contractor's 
responsibilities as are bucket teeth which are not covered by the 
manufacturer. [Tr. 663]. He said the equipment lessors would 
replace all the axle system, the battery charging systems, and 
the problems in the hydraulic system, unless there was proven 
negligence on the part of the contractor. [Tr. 663]. He testified 
the component parts of the hydraulic system would be replaced by 
the lessor free of charge such as the pumps, the motors, and the 
lines. [Tr. 663]. 
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Mr. Babcock was then asked concerning Ex. D-14 which item-
ized all of the parts and labor used in the repair of the hydraulic 
system, and testified these would be items to be repaired free of 
charge by the lessor, except possibly the filter. [Tr. 665]. He 
further testified the term "reasonable wear and tear" would 
apply to repacking the cylinders, including the boom cylinders, 
the stick cylinders, and the bucket cylinders, as well as outside 
hoses that wear out through vibration and aging. [Tr. 672-673]. 
This testimony was also corroborated by plaintiffs' mechanic Ray 
Baldwin who was also permitted to testify as to fair wear and 
tear in the industry. [Tr. 371-72]. 
On cross-examination by plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Babcock 
wwas asked what the language in paragraph 6 of the lease meant 
when it said the lessee shall keep the equipment in good repair 
and condition. [Tr. 731]. He stated "that means to perform the 
function of servicing and greasing as is normal in the industry. 
To keep the machine greased and functioning satisfactorily and 
handling it in that fashion." He was then asked the question "In 
the industry, the word 'repair' then would have no meaning?" He 
answered this question by stating "No. If the machine was damaged 
running into something, swinging into a tree or building or a 
vehicle and something was jannned up against the motor, I would 
feel that it would be the responsibility of the contractor to 
get that fixed if it was going to cause more damage." [Tr. 732]. 
Jay Tuft was also permitted to testify as to what the terms 
"fair wear and tear" or "reasonable wear and tear" meant in the 
industry. [Tr. 801]. Again, the trial judge stated "I think we 
have to have some testimony and some evidence to be able to 
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define the term. I don't think it's subject to interpretation 
without some testimony." (emphasis added) [Tr. 801]. Mr. Tuft 
testified that he had equipment with other equipment lessors who 
have repaired similar damage as repaired by ASCO and he has not 
been charged for the same. [Tr. 802]. He stated Arnold Machinery 
Company replaced a hydraulic swing motor and also an axle. [Tr. 
803]. 
He was permitted to testify without any objection from 
plaintiffs' counsel that all of the problems testified to earlier 
that morning by his wife, LaRue Tuft [See her testimony Tr. 752 
et seq] would have been taken care of and repaired free of charge 
by the equipment lessor under the standard custom and usage of 
the industry. [Tr. 803-804]. He further testified that the 
terms in paragraph 6 stating "the lessee shall keep the equipment 
in good repair and condition" do have a certain meaning in the 
industry. [Tr. 804]. He stated this meaning was that the lessee 
will grease the machine and change the oil and take care of any 
operator-caused damage. [Tr. 804], however, the lessee would not 
be responsible to take care of broken axles or problems with the 
charging system or the hydraulic system. [Tr. 804]. 
Under these circumstances, the defendant submits the only 
evidence in this case to assist the jury in determining what the 
terms used in paragraph 6 of the EQUIPMENT LEASE AGREEMENT meant 
was the testimony of Harold Babcock and Jay Tuft to the effect 
that the equipment lessors would be responsible to repair the 
three categories of defects and damages which were found to exist 
in the backhoe and that said repairs should be done free of 
charge to the lessee. 
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5. There was no contract between the parties requiring 
the defendant to pay for the repairs. The lease agreement does 
not contain any requirement that Jay Tuft & Company pay ASCO for 
any repairs that might be made on the backhoe. [Ex. P-1]. The 
trial judge himself admitted that there was no express contract. 
[Tr. 218]. Furthermore, it is clear the work orders which it is 
alleged the defendants employees executed, were between Jay Tuft 
& Company and Shurtleff & Andrews Construction, a separate and 
distinct entity from ASCO. [Ex. P-6 and D-7 through D-17, Tr. 24, 
25, and 40]. These work orders specifically state in part as 
follows: "I, the undersigned, hereby represent to Shurtleff & 
Andrews the following in consideration for Shurtleff & Andrews 
undertaking the work herein specified. II [Ex. P-6 and D-7 
through D-17]. ASCO's general manager, Harvey Carson, testified 
several times that ASCO and Shurtleff & Andrews were separate 
companies, [Tr. 24 and 25] and that all of the mechanics were 
employed by Shurtleff & Andrews [Tr. 24, 25,40, 86, 120]. 
Nor is there any evidence of an implied contract. Darrell 
Hulse testified he told Jay Tuft to call ASCO if Tuft had any 
problems with the backhoe and ASCO would take care of the problem 
free of charge unless there was operator abuse. [Tr. 145. See also 
POINT 1(3) supra]. Harvey Carson testified that when he got the 
call he dispatched mechanics from Shurtleff & Andrews to make the 
repairs. (Tr. 25]. Mr. Carson also admitted that Jay Tuft & 
Company had had two prior leases over the last year and a half 
using the same backhoe. [Tr. 110]. However, neither Mr. Carson 
nor plaintiffs' other witnesses testified Jay Tuft & Company 
agreed to pay for the repair work that was done, and the transcript 
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is therefore silent as to any evidence that would support an 
inference that there was a promise on the part of Jay Tuft & 
Company to pay ASCO for the repairs. Mr. Carson had a conversation 
with Jay Tuft six weeks before the backhoe was repossessed, and 
the amount of eleven thousand dollars ($11,000.00) being due for 
the decontamination of the hydraulic system was discussed. [Tr. 
39]. At that time Mr. Carson admitted Tuft denied he had any 
responsibility for the repairs and he wasn't going to pay for 
them. [Tr. 39) . Jay Tuft's testimony was to the same effect. 
[Tr. 821-822). 
On the other hand, the record does show that the plaintiffs 
paid for nearly eight hundred dollars ($800.00) worth of repairs 
to the machine which were found to be necessary at the Murray job 
site. [Ex. P-6] . This argues against any contract for Jay Tuft 
to pay for the repairs. Furthermore, Darrell Hulse, the office 
manager and bookkeeper, prepared an exhibit showing that there 
were other repairs made to the backhoe approximating nearly three 
thousand dollars ($3,000.00) which were not charged to Jay Tuft & 
Company. [Ex. P-21). The policy of ASCO to pay for repairs for 
major items such as axles breaking, charging systems going out, 
and hydraulic systems becoming contaminated requiring the replacement 
of pumps, etc. has already been discussed in reviewing the testimony 
of Darrell Hulse, who was the only one of plaintiffs witnesses 
who had any discussion with Jay Tuft about who was to pay for the 
repairs. [See POINT 1(3) supra]. 
6. The plaintiff is not the real party in interest to 
collect any amounts for repairs to the backhoe because the work 
orders allegedly signed by the defendant's employees constituted 
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a promise to pay certain amounts to Shurtleff & Andrews Construction 
Company, a company distinct and separate from plaintiff American 
Sales Company herein; and there was no evidence of anv assignment 
of these work orders to the plaintiff herein. Rule 17 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that every action shall be 
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. As already 
discussed, the work orders which it is alleged the defendant's 
employees executed were a promise to pay certain amounts to 
Shurtleff & Andrews Construction, an entity separate and distinct 
from American Sales Company, the plaintiff herein. [Tr. 25, 40, 
86, 120]. In order for American Sales Company to be able to sue 
on the said work orders, it would have to be shown that there was 
an assignment. [(Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 U. 2d 427, 367 P. 2d 464 
( 1962)]. There is no evidence in the record before this court 
that any such assignment was made. If ASCO is allowed to recover 
for these amounts, then Shurtleff & Andrews Construction still 
has a right to sue on their written agreement, and the defendant 
would be subject to a double payment. 
In its AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM the defendant denied 
there was any basis for the claim that defendant owed to the 
plaintiff sums of money requested. [R. 150-157]. In DEFENDANT'S 
ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS' INTERROGATORIES and in answer to interrogatory 
no. 3, the defendant raised the issue of Shurtleff & Andrews 
being the responsible parties since they were the ones who supplied 
the labor and parts for repairs to the backhoe. [R. 158-172]. 
At the close of the plaintiffs' case, the defendant made a 
motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it was not 
being prosecuted by the real party in interest. [Tr. 474-479]. 
-33-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The trial judge denied the motion with this comment: 
"I think that the evidence is sufficient and is adequate 
and there is a basis upon which the jury might find that 
there was a contractual obligation on the part of the 
defendants to pay for service provided as between the 
parties to this lawsuit. For that reason, I will deny the 
mot ion . " [Tr . 4 7 9] . 
As pointed out above in this brief, there was no contractual 
obligation on the part of Jay Tuft & Company to pay ASCO for the 
repairs. [See POINT I (5) supra on pages of this brief] . 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, 
no request was made by the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to 
show that an assignment has been made from Shurtleff & Andrews to 
ASCO; nor was any motion made to add Shurtleff & Andrews as a 
party-plaintiff in the instant lawsuit. Had such a request been 
made, Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows 
discretion to the trial judge to add or substitute the real party 
in interest. However, this was not requested by the plaintiffs 
and was not done by the trial judge. It is clear from the record 
that both the plaintiffs and the trial judge believed there was 
sufficient basis in the evidence to show a contract between the 
parties in this lawsuit, and the real party in interest issue was 
not felt to be meritorious. [Tr. 474-479]. 
7. The plaintiffs will be unjustly enriched if the amounts 
charged for repairs are sustained by this court. It is clear the 
jury did not allow any credit whatever for fair wear and tear in 
the o-rings, repacking hydraulic cylinders, stick cylinders, 
etc.; even though all the plaintiffs' witnesses admitted this 
would be fair wear and tear for which the plaintiffs would be 
liable. [Tr. 99, 146, 175, 371-372, 448]. 
The plaintiffs' witnesses further admitted the monthly 
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rental of four thousand eight hundred dollars ($4800.00) contained 
a reserve for repairs, maintenance, and depreciation. [Tr. 7, 54-
55, 206]. To allow the jury to award an additional sixteen 
thousand dollars ($16,000.00) for repairs and maintenance constitutes 
a windfall to the plaintiffs and is unconscionable. 
Finally, the defendant submits the plaintiffs backhoe has 
been substantially improved at defendant's expense to the point the 
plaintiffs offered to sell the backhoe to Harold Babcock in his 
lease which is dated April 1978 for eighty seven thousand dollars 
($87,000.00) which is three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) more 
than the plaintiffs offered to sell the same backhoe to Jay Tuft 
some thirteen (13) months earlier. [Exs. P-1, D-43]. 
The unjust result of all this is that the plaintiffs have 
received back their backhoe which they offered to sell to Jay 
Tuft & Company for eighty four thousand dollars ($84,000.00), 
have received twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000.00) in rent 
already paid by the defendant, have received thirty-six thousand 
dollars ($36,000.00) awarded by the jury, or a total amount of 
nearly sixty thousand dollars ($60,000.00) for rent and repair 
during the time Jay Tuft had the backhoe. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ALLOWING RAY 
BALDWIN, A MECHANIC FOR SHURTLEFF & ANDREWS CONSTRUCTION CO. TO 
GIVE HIS OPINION THAT THE BACKHOE HAD NOT BEEN MAINTAINED IN A 
PROPER CONDITION; BECAUSE THE MECHANIC HAD NEVER SEEN THE BACKHOE 
OPERATED IMPROPERLY, HAD NEVER TALKED TO ANY OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
OPERATORS ABOUT HOW THEY OPERATED THE BACKHOE, ADMITTED THAT HE 
DID NOT KNOW WHETHER IT HAD BEEN OPERATED PROPERLY OR NOT, AND 
BECAUSE THE MECHANIC HIMSELF WAS THE PRINCIPAL OPERATOR OF THE 
MACHINE FOR SEVERAL DAYS PRIOR TO THE TIME THE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 
WAS DETERMINED TO BE CONTAMINATED. 
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Ray Baldwin, the mechanic from ASCO was dispatched to the 
Alpine job site to repair the backhoe when the bucket and boom 
could not be moved out of the trench. [Tr. 303-304]. He further 
testified that he was at the job site approximately eleven (11) 
times from November 16th through January 7th working on the 
hydraulic system. [Tr. 326-330]. After testifying as to what he 
did during those eleven (11) times, he was asked the following 
question: "Based on your inspection of the machine and the work 
that you did do on these project, including the Alpine project, 
can you tell us, in your judgment, whether the machine was and 
had been maintained in a proper condition?" [Tr. 321]. 
An objection was made on lack of foundation and other 
reasons that there was no showing Mr. Baldwin knew how the machine 
was maintained, that he had checked any of the lubrication charts 
to know the maintenance was improper or ever had talked with 
the operators to determine whether it was maintained properly. 
[Tr. 321, 322]. The only answer to this objection was that Mr. 
Baldwin was an expert with seventeen (17) years of experience as 
a mechanic, that he made an inspection of the machine and should 
be able to give his opinion. [Tr. 322]. Based on this status of 
the record, the trial judge allowed Mr. Baldwin to answer the 
question. [Tr. 322). 
No other witness testified the backhoe was maintained 
improperly and there is no other testimony in the record in the 
form of expert opinion directly supporting a jury finding there 
was operator abuse or improper maintenance of the machine insofar 
as the hydraulic system was concerned. This Honorable Supreme 
Court has held expert testimony as to the possibility of a cause 
will not support a verdict if such testimony is the only basis 
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upon which to arrive at a verdict. (Christianson v. Debry, 23 U. 
Zd 334, 463 P. 2d 5 (1969)]. 
Furthermore, it is obvious from the transcript of Mr. Baldwin's 
testimony that there was absolutely no foundation for his opinion. 
At the time the witness was permitted to give his opinion, he had 
testified as to the following: (a) the backhoe was being operated 
properly by Jay Tuft's crews at the Decker Lake job (Tr. 286]; 
and (b) He admitted that most operators will open the door and 
look at the visual indicators on the main hydraulic filter; 
however, he did not know of his own personal knowledge whether 
the operator on the Alpine job did or did not do this (Tr. 330-
331]. 
Cross-examination of Mr. Baldwin reflected an even further 
lack of foundation. He testified (c) he himself never made any 
visual inspection of the hydraulic filters for several days prior 
to the time he determined the system was contaminated; even 
though he was on the ground each day working on exactly the same 
problem as the day before (Tr. 323]; (d) He admitted that he had 
never observed any of Jay Tuft's employees that were not warming 
up the machine the way he had explained to them it should be done 
(Tr. 369]; and (e) He admitted that he had never been around the 
machine when it was warmed up and didn't have any personal knowledge 
as to whether the operators were following the correct warm-up 
procedures or not. [Tr. 369]. 
In the case of Day Lorenzo Smith & Son, Inc., 17 U. 2d 221, 
408 P. 2d 186 (1965) this Honorable Court held that a trial judge 
erroneously permitted a highway patrolman who did not see an 
accident to testify as to the point of impact, where such opinion 
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was not supported by sufficient facts, and what meager facts were 
testified to were not connected up or related to the opinion and were 
inadequate to support the patrolman's conclusion; and this court 
further held that the said error was prejudicial since the point of 
impact was an important fact, if not a controlling one, to be det-
ermined by the jury in reaching its verdict. Similarly in the instant 
case the defendant submits it was prejudicial error for the trial 
judge to allow Ray Baldwin to testify that the machine had been 
maintained improperly when this was the controlling point to be 
determined by the jury in reaching its verdict and when it was clear 
Ray Baldwin's opinion was not supported by sufficient facts, and what 
meager facts he did testify to were not connected up or related to the 
opinion and were inadequate to support his conclusion on the state of 
the record at the time he gave his opinion and thereafter. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY NOT ALLOWING 
DEFENDANT'S EXPERT WITNESS, HAROLD BABCOCK TO TESTIFY REGARDING 
THE MERCHANTABLE CONDITION OF THE BACKHOE BECAUSE SUCH TESTIMONY 
MUST COME FROM EXPERT WITNESSES AND IT WAS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES 
RAISED IN THE DEFENDAT'S COUNTERCLAIM. 
The defendant's counterclaim alleged, among other things, a 
breach of implied warranty of merchantability. [R. 152-157]. The 
counterclaim raised the issue of whether Article II of the Uniform 
Commercial Code dealing with implied warranties in sales transactions 
applies to leases. [See ~6 of the counterclaim at R. 153]. Both 
parties submitted trial memoranda dealing with the applicability 
of the Utah Uniform Cornmercial Code to lease agreements. [R. 
214-223, 204-213]. The trial judge ruled that the said Uniform 
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Commercial Code did in fact, apply to lease transactions. (See 
Instruction No. 21 (R. 364)]. 
The courts have unanimously held that such items as merchant-
ability and fitness for a particular purpose are matters for expert 
testimony and cannot be left to the jury where such testimony is 
lacking in the record. [31 Am. Jur. 2d 712-714, EXPERT AND OPINION 
TESTIMONY, Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales; 557 P. 2d 1009 (Utah 
1976) Hooper v. General Motors Corp. 260 P. 2d 549 (Utah, 1953)]. 
Defendant's expert, Harold Babcock, was permitted by the 
trial judge to testify as to what the terms "ordinary wear and 
tear" or "reasonable wear and tear" meant in the equipment leasing 
business insofar as it pertained to the instant lease and the 
model 35 backhoe. [Tr. 663]. When plaintiffs' counsel objected, 
the court said "Well, certainly we're going to need a definition 
of that term and I suppose it will have to come from those who 
are familiar with its usage in the industry, so I think it is 
relevant." Mr. Babcock further testified as to the meanings of 
the terms in paragraph 6 of the lease agreement requiring the 
lessee· to keep the equipment in good repair and condition. [Tr. 
731] . 
Mr. Babcock stated he had been in court during the time the 
mechanic Ray Baldwin and plaintiffs expert Charles Wienke testified 
and that he did recall Mr. Baldwin's experience working on the 
machine and the number of times he testified that he was at the 
job site and the type of problems he was working on. [Tr. 669]. 
Mr. Babcock was then asked if he had an opinion whether a backhoe 
with those kind of problems and as related to the lease agreement 
[Ex. P-1 which was exactly the same kind of lease agreement Mr. 
Babcock himself signed to lease the backhoe after it was repossessed 
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by ASCO (See Ex. D-43)] would be merchantable or not. [Tr. 669] . 
This was a simple yes or no type question; yet the trial judge 
sustained an objection to this question and stated "I think 
that's something that this gentleman is not qualified to answer." 
[Tr. 670]. The following question was then asked by the defendant's 
counsel: 
MR. McINTOSH: Your Honor, in view of the ruling, would 
it be the court's interpretation that 
merchantable condition would not come 
through expert witnesses, it is something 
the jury would decide without any help 
from them? 
THE COURT: That's my feeling. 
MR. McINTOSH: All right. 
Based on this reply by the trial judge, the defendant did 
not pursue the matter further, as it otherwise would have done. 
It is obvious the trial judge would not permit any expert testimony 
on the issue of merchantability or "fitness for the ordinary 
purposes for which such goods are used" which is how the court 
defined "merchantable". [See Instruction No. 27, R.370]. The 
trial judge appears to either believe the witness was not qualified 
to answer questions dealing with merchantability or that "expert" 
testimony is not admissible at all to prove the condition. 
Mr. Babcock certainly was qualified by both schooling and 
experience. He had thirty five (35) years in the construction 
business and was the president of Engineers Construction, Inc., a 
Utah corporation engaged in the business of installing water and 
sewer lines. He held a registered professional engineer's rating 
in four states and had used all types of heavy equipment, including 
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dozers, scrapers, backhoes, loaders, ditchers, pavers, and was 
familiar with various leases containing language similar to that 
in the instant case and had, in fact, purchased and leased equipment 
involving hydraulic systems, axle-driving systems, and battery-
charging systems similar to those found on the American hydraulic 
backhoe model 35 [Tr. 651-661]. 
The trial judge gave instructions dealing with merchantability 
[Instruction Nos. 25-29, R. 368-372], and defined "merchantable" 
to be at least such as 
(a) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract 
description, and 
(b) Is fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods 
are used. [Instruction No. 27 (R. 370)]. 
By refusing to allow expert testimony on this issue, the 
trial judge permitted the jury to speculate on whether the 
backhoe would pass in the trade and would be fit for the ordinary 
purposes for which the backhoe was to be used. 
Since the issue of merchantability of thezbackhoe was the 
foundation and the basis for defendant's counterclaim insofar as 
lost profits and consequential damages were concerned, testimony 
relating to this issue was critical to the defendant's burden of 
proof on its counterclaim. Under these circumstances the error 
was prejudicial since it left defendants without the required 
testimony on this critical issue and also permitted the jury to 
speculate or to find that the defendant had not covered the 
burden of proof. 
The defendant submits the trial court's inconsistent ruling 
in allowing expert testimony from both Harold Babcock and Jay 
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Tuft as to the terms and provisions used in paragraph 6 of the 
lease agreement, but stating that such testimony was not admissable 
on the issue of merchantability of the backhoe, would further 
tend to confuse the jury and mislead them into thinking that it 
was not necessary to have expert testimony on the terms in paragraph 
6 of the lease agreement and they could totally disregard the 
testimony of Harold Babcock on those terms also. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY REFUSING TO 
ADMIT EXHIBIT D-44 INTO EVIDENCE WHICH WAS A CHRONOLOGICAL LIST 
OF THE PROBLEMS WITH THE BACKHOE, BECAUSE IT WAS RELEVANT TO THE 
MERCHANTABLE CONDITION OF THE BACKHOE. 
In the preceeding POINT III of this argument, the defendants 
have discussed the issue of prejudicial error which was committed 
by the trial judge in refusing to allow Harold Babcock to testify 
as to the merchantable condition of the backhoe. Under this 
POINT IV, the defendant submits the trial judge went one step 
further in removing from the jury certain documentary evidence 
which bore solely on the issue of the merchantable condition of 
the backhoe. This documentary evidence was in the form of Exhibit 
D-44. [Tr. 746]. 
From the day the backhoe was delivered to the Murray job 
site on March 21, 1977, until the day it was picked up from the 
Alpine job site ten (10) months later on January 23, 1978, the 
backhoe experienced regular and serious disrepair, problems of 
all sorts, and substantial down time. All of these matters dealt 
with the "merchantable" condition of the backhoe. These problems 
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were summarized in chronological order on Exhibit D-44 which 
defendant offered pursuant to Rules 67 and 70(l)(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence as those rules were interpreted by the Utah 
Supreme Court a few months before the trial in the case of 
Gull Laboratories Inc. v. Louis A. Rosser, Co., 589 P. 2d 756 
(Utah, 1978). 
Exhibit D-44 was a summary of the problems which the defendant 
experienced with the backhoe during the lease term. The surmnary 
was prepared by LaRue Tuft, office manager and bookkeeper of the 
defendant [Tr. 258] from books and records kept in the normal 
course of business. [Tr. 743-745]. The surrnnary listed the exact 
source where the information was obtained, that is progress 
reports, telephone logs, ASCO invoices, Jay Tuft's diary and 
journals, etc. [Tr. 743-745, Ex. D-44]. All of the underlying 
books and records referred to in the exhibit had been made available 
to plaintiffs' counsel substantially in advance of the trial date 
and the original books and records were in court for plaintiffs' 
counsel to use in cross-examination. [Tr. 743-746]. The original 
sources were noted on the exhibit to make it easier for the 
witness to produce the original source documents during cross-
examination by plaintiffs' counsel. 
The court refused to admit this exhibit. [Although the 
transcript does not reflect the court's refusal to allow the 
exhibit, the official exhibit sheet itself shows Exhibit D-44 was 
offered but refused. (R. 250). And the transcript shows the 
court did discuss this matter with counsel in chambers. (Tr. 747-
748)]. Plaintiffs' counsel objected to the exhibit being 
admitted simply on the grounds that it was hearsay. [Tr. 745-
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746). Since business records are an exception to the hearsay 
rule pursuant to Rule 67 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, it is 
clear this objection was not a valid one and the court should not 
have sustained it. 
The defendant submits the summary was admissable pursuant to 
Rule 67 and 70(l)(f) of the Utah Rules of Evidence as construed 
by the Utah Supreme Court in the Gull Laboratories case supra. 
The summary would certainly have been helpful to the jury in the 
jury room in reviewing all of the chronological problems that 
occurred with the backhoe. This information would have been 
helpful to them in resolving both the issues as to whether the 
mechanics were competent to make the repairs as well as the issue 
of whether the backhoe itself was merchantable. [Christopher v 
Larson Ford Sales, supra]. Since these issues were so germane to 
both the plaintiffs and the defendant's case, it is clear the 
error in refusing to admit them was prejudicial. 
The trial judge did allow LaRue Tuft to testify generally as 
to the problems with the backhoe and to use the exhibit to refresh 
her memory. [Tr. 752 et seq). And it is true that some of the 
problems were generally reflected on Exs. P-6 and D-7 through D-
17 which are the charges ASCO made to the defendant with the 
Shurtleff & Andrews work orders attached. However, these exhibits 
do not indicate many of the problems that were noted on phone 
logs, progress reports, daily diaries and other documents which 
were more fully identified on Exhibit D-44. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING 
INSTRUCTION NOS. 25 and 29 BECAUSE THE SAID INSTRUCTIONS ARE AN 
INACCURATE STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND ARE IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27. 
Instruction No. 29 reads as follows: 
In this case the burden of proof with respect to 
the applicability of the implied warranty of merchant-
ability rests upon the defendant to s~ow by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the backhoe was in a defective 
condition at the time the lease commenced on March 21, 
1977, and that there was no change in the mechanical 
condition of the backhoe from the time the lease 
commenced until such time as the backhoe experienced 
the mechanical difficulties in question. In the absence 
of proof of a defect in the backhoe on March 21, 1977, 
the plaintiffs may not be held liable on a theory of 
implied warranty. [R. 372]. 
Instruction no. 25 is similar in content. [R. 368]. The 
court's nstruction Nos. 25 and 29, were copied verbatim from the 
plaintiffs' proposed instruction nos. 5 and 13. [R. 312 and 304]. 
The defendant took an appropriate formal exception to these 
instructions on the same grounds and for the same reasons as set 
forth in this POINT V. [Tr. 980-982]. 
These instructions state in affect, that unless all of the 
troubles with the backhoe originated and existed on March 21, 
1977, there is absolutely no way the plaintiffs can recover on a 
breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The defects and 
problems with the backhoe are set forth in chronological order in 
Exhibit D-44 which is discussed infra Point IV. These defects 
are also set forth in the testimony of LaRue Tuft [Tr. 752 et 
~], and generally in Exhibits P-6 and D-7 through D-17. The 
defendant submits it is not necessary to show that each of the 
defects mentioned existed on March 21, 1977; rather it is only 
necessary to show that problems arose throughout the term of the 
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lease, and that the cumulative effect of these problems made the 
backhoe unfit for the normal purposes for which it is ordinarily 
used. Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, 557 P. 2d 1009 (Utah, 
1976). This is what Mr. Babcock would have testified about had 
he been permitted to do so. [See POINT III supra]. 
Some of the defects such as the problems with the charging 
system and the axle which broke on the job in Wellington, Utah, 
obviously did not exist on March 21, 1977, because the alternator 
and axle were replaced within a few days after Jay Tuft & Company 
took possession of the backhoe. [Ex. P-6]. Furthermore many of 
the hydraulic problems, including the deterioration of the 
hydraulic pumps, could be attributable to ordinary wear and tear 
on the machine as testified to by defendant's expert witnesses 
and also by plaintiffs' expert witnesses; [See POINTS I(3) and 
(4) supra] and yet such problems became so numerous and substantial, 
they made the backhoe unmerchantable simply by virtue of the 
existence of the said problems. Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, 
supra. 
By requiring the defendant to show that the defects all 
existed on March 21, 1977, is to totally ignore the fact that the 
lease agreement provided for monthly payments every thirty (30) 
days, and consequently the "term" of the lease was for successive 
periodic or monthly periods of time. The trial judge recognized 
this fact and instructed the jury as follows: "This implied 
warranty of merchantability attaches to the backhoe for each 
separate monthly term during which time the EQUIPMENT LEASE 
AGREEMENT was in effect." [Instruction No. 27. (R. 370)]. 
Instruction nos. 25 and 29 are totally inconsistent with these 
statements in instruction no. 27, and it would be impossible for 
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the jury not to be confused by the said statements. After first 
instructing the jury in instruction no. 27 that a breach of 
implied warranty of merchantability could be found for each 
separate, successive, monthly term, the trial judge then only two 
pages later in the instructions did a complete about face and 
stated that the defendant could not recover unless it could prove 
all the problems with the backhoe existed on March 21, 1977. 
The courts have uniformly held that giving two inconsistent 
instructions that would tend to confuse the jury constitutes 
prejudicial error, and that giving a correct instruction cannot 
cure the error in another contradictory erroneous instruction 
even though the trial judge states the jury must consider the 
instructions as a whole. Smith v. Aberdeen, 7 Wash. App. 664, 
502 P. 2d 1034 (1972). Francis v. City and County of San Francisco, 
282 P. 2d 456 (Calif. 1955); MacDonald Equipment Company v. McMillan 
Construction Company, Colo. App., 480 P. 2d 589 (1971); Ieronimo 
v. Hagerman, 93 Ariz. 357, 380 P. 2d 1013 (1963). 
Finally by instructing the jury the defendant had to show by 
a perponderance of the evidence there was no change in the mechan-
ical condition of the backhoe from the time the lease connnenced 
until such time as the backhoe experienced the mechanical difficulty 
in question is an inaccurate statement of the law and an impossible 
burden under the state of the evidence. In the first place the 
mechanical problem in Wellington in January, 1977 with the charging 
system and axle had already been repaired on March 22, 1977, by 
Shurtleff & Andrews mechanics [Ex. P-6] and therefore there was a 
change in the mechanical condition of the backhoe after the lease 
term commenced on March 21, 1977. and the change was caused by 
mechanics dispatched by ASCO. Moreover, the hydraulic problem in 
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Alpine several successive days after November 16, 1977, were 
represented to be corrected each night when Ray Baldwin replaced 
unloading valves, etc. The subsequent daily problems existed 
from the day before from the new unloader valve, etc and not from 
March 21, 1977. Under these circumstances there was a change in 
the mechanical condition caused by the plaintiffs own mechanic 
yet no allowance is made in the instruction for that fact. 
Finally, the instruction does not take into account the change in 
mechanical conditions for ordinary wear and tear which all the 
witnesses, both plaintiffs' and defendant's, testified would 
require the replacement of parts and packing of hydraulic cylinders, 
etc. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY GIVING 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 DEALING WITH WAIVER BECAUSE IT USURPS THE 
PROVINCE OF THE JURY TO WEIGH THE EVIDENCE AND AMOUNTS TO A 
DIRECTED VERDICT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT ON THIS ISSUE. 
Instruction No. 20 reads as follows: 
Where it is difficult to determine whether a 
particular act merely sheds light on the meaning of 
the agreement or represents a waiver of a term of the 
agreement, the preference is in favor of waiver. Thus 
even if you find that the plaintiff on occasion did not 
charge the defendant for certain repairs or gave the 
defendant credit for down time, the preferred interpretation 
of such action is that the plaintiff waived its claim 
against the defendant for those repairs and down time 
not charged for rather that the interpretation of such 
action constitutes a course of performance which indicates 
an intent not to charge the defendant for any down time 
or for any repairs. [R. 363] . 
The court's instruction was copied verbatim from the plaintiffs' 
proposed instruction no. 28 [R. 327]. The defendant took timely 
formal exception to the said instruction. [Tr. 982]. 
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The defendant submits the instruction amounted to both a 
finding of fact and a review of the evidence by the trial judge 
and takes away from the jurors the sole province which they had 
to weigh the evidence and make a finding whether there was in 
fact any so-called and alleged "waiver" or whether the gratuitous 
repairs on past occasions represented a policy on the part of the 
plaintiffs to render the future repairs also gratuitously. The 
trial judge effectively instructed the jury to find there was a 
"waiver" and has taken away from the jury its function to determine 
what weight should be given to Darrell Lester's exhibit P-21 and 
the other evidence as it bore on the critical issue of who was to 
pay for the repairs. By interfering with the jury's province in 
interpreting the evidence as it would relate to the issues of 
"waiver" and gratuitous repairs [even assuming that waiver was a 
relevant issue which defendant denies it was] the court has 
corrrrnitted prejudicial error. [Flynn v.Harlin Construction Co., 
29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P. 2d 356 ( 1973)]. This instruction is in 
effect a directed verdict on the issue. Durrant v. Pelton, 16 U. 
2d 7, 394 P. 2d 879 (1964). 
Plaintiffs' bookkeeper and office manager, Darrell Lester, 
introduced an exhibit showing approximately three thousand dollars 
($3,000.00) worth of repairs paid for by ASCO during the term of 
the lease and which were not charged to the defendant. [Ex. P-
21]. It also is clear the plaintiffs did, in fact, pay for all 
the repairs that were made on the Murray job site to include the 
replacement of a broken axle, replacement of alternator, etc. 
[Ex. P-6. (Tr. )] . This testimony had a direct bearing on the 
issue of whether the repairs made to the backhoe would be made 
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free of charge, or whether they should be billed to the defendant. 
[See POINT I(3) infra], and the trial judge should have instructed 
the jury to determine the relevancy of this evidence rather than 
instructing them they must find a waiver. 
There was not one shred of testimony from any of plaintiffs' 
witnesses dealing with the issue of "waiver", as used in the 
court's instruction no. 20. None of these witnesses stated the 
repairs were made free of charge because of any good samaritan 
waiver. There was in fact, no explanation by these witnesses as 
to why Exhibit P-21 was offered into evidence. 
The defendant submits the instruction is not a correct 
statement of the law and has found no cases substantiating the 
instruction. Furthermore, the court failed to define the term 
"waiver" and therefore it could only be confusing to the jury 
to try to interpret it as used in the instruction and then relate 
the term to the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant submits this 
Honorable Supreme Court should reverse the JUDGMENT ON VERDICT OF 
JURY appealed from and should set aside the jury verdict awarding 
to the plaintiffs the sum of sixteen thousand six hundred fifty-
one dollars and seventy-three cents ($16,651.73) for repairs to 
the backhoe; and should further order a new trial on the remaining 
issues raised in the plaintiffs' complaint dealing with the 
alleged rentals which were due and owing and the defendant's 
counterclaim dealing with loss of profits on the Alpine job. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
McMURRAY & ANDERSON 
JAMES A. McINTOSH 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant -50-
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